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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Idaho Code § 19-3501(1) requires a district court to dismiss a criminal prosecution if an
indictment or information is not filed within six months of “the date of his arrest.” Mr. Morgan
asserts that he was arrested for felony eluding in February of 2010, when he was taken by
Montana officers, to be arraigned in front of a Montana Justice of the Peace, who ordered
Mr. Morgan to remain in a Montana jail, at the request of a Montana prosecutor, all stemming
from an arrest warrant issued by an Idaho Magistrate. Because the charging document was not
filed in this case until July of 2015, Mr. Morgan asserts that the district court erred in denying his
motions to dismiss the felony eluding charge for violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In late December of 2009, Idaho State Trooper Aaron Bingham noticed a car with an
“extremely loud” muffler travelling on Interstate 84 in Minidoka County, and he tried to pull the
car over. (R., pp.13-14.) The car sped away from Trooper Bingham, pulled off the interstate,
and eventually drove into the parking lot of a Walmart. (R., pp.14-16.) Trooper Bingham
learned that Dustin Morgan was the driver, but he was unable to apprehend Mr. Morgan at that
time. (R., pp.15-16.)
On January 11, 2010, the State filed a criminal complaint charging Mr. Morgan with
felony eluding a police officer, and with misdemeanor driving without privileges, and a warrant
for his arrest was issued. (R., p.59.) Mr. Morgan was arrested in Lake County, Montana on the
Idaho warrant 10 days later. (R., pp.59, 113.) The Lake County Attorney’s Office filed a
document titled “Complaint and Affidavit Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,” noting that
Mr. Morgan was in the Lake County Jail pursuant to the Idaho arrest warrant, and requesting
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bond be set in the amount of $10,000.00 as requested in the Idaho arrest warrant.
(R., pp.126 128.) A Lake County Justice of the Peace issued a warrant ordering Mr. Morgan to
be committed to the Lake County Jail until February 20, 2010, “to enable the arrest of the
accused to be made upon a warrant of the governor on a requisition of the executive authority of
the State of Idaho as set forth in MCA 46-30-302,” and setting bail at $10,000.00. (R., pp.59,
113, 124-25.)
On February 23, 2010, the Justice of the Peace ordered Mr. Morgan to be released from
the Lake County Jail because the State of Montana failed to file a timely motion to extend
Mr. Morgan’s incarceration. (R., pp.114-116.) It appears that Mr. Morgan was not released
from the Lake County Jail as ordered by the Justice of the Peace because, on February 1, 2010,
Mr. Morgan was charged with committing various crimes in Montana. (R., pp.13-16, 57-58, 75,
114-116; PSI, p.11.) That same day, the State of Idaho dismissed the charges and filed a new
criminal complaint charging Mr. Morgan with the same crimes, based upon the same affidavit of
probable cause filed by Trooper Bingham in the original case, and a new arrest warrant was
issued noting specifically that Mr. Morgan was located at the Lake County Jail. (R., pp.13-16,
57-58, 75.) Three days later, on February 26, 2010, Mr. Morgan was again brought in front of
the Lake County Justice of the Peace, the Justice of the Peace again issued a warrant ordering
Mr. Morgan to be held in the Lake County Jail for 30 days in order “to enable the arrest of the
accused to be made upon a warrant of the governor on a requisition of the executive authority of
the State of Idaho as set forth in MCA 46-30-302,” and the Justice of the Peace again set bail at
$10,000.00. (R., pp.57, 75, 101, 105-06.)
In early March of 2010, Idaho Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter entered a formal request to
his counterpart in Montana, Governor Brian Schweitzer, that Mr. Morgan “be arrested and
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secured and delivered to MINIDOKA County Sheriff KEVIN HALVERSON, and/or his
designated agent, who is hereby authorized to receive, convey and transport him to this State,
here to be dealt with according to law.” (R., p.61.) Governor Otter’s request was accompanied
by various documents attesting to the fact that an Idaho Magistrate had found probable cause to
believe that Mr. Morgan had committed felony eluding, and that a criminal complaint had been
filed charging Mr. Morgan with that crime. (R., pp.61-81.)
Mr. Morgan was brought before a Montana District Court judge on April 8, 2010, to deal
with his extradition case, and his counsel asked for and was granted a one-week extension in
order to discuss the matter further with Mr. Morgan. (R., p.100.) The next week, Mr. Morgan
was again brought before a Montana District Court judge, and his counsel indicated that the
parties agreed to continue the extradition proceedings until after Mr. Morgan was sentenced on
his Montana charges. On May 20, 2010, Mr. Morgan appeared in district court to be sentenced
on his Montana charges.1 (R., p.98.) The Court Minutes state Mr. Morgan’s counsel “indicates
that the Defendant is willing to waive extradition and the State does have a governor’s warrant so
at this time the State moves to dismiss the extradition.” (R., p.98.) With no objection from the
defense, the district court dismissed the extradition proceedings. (R., p.98.) Mr. Morgan was
sentenced to the Montana Department of Correction for 15 years, with 10 years suspended.
(R., p.98.) The State of Idaho took no further action to secure Mr. Morgan’s presence to face
trial on the Idaho charges.
In April of 2014, after serving nearly four years in a Montana prison, Mr. Morgan was
granted parole and allowed to return to Idaho. (R., pp.151, 153.) Thirteen months later, on

Mr. Morgan entered into a plea agreement with the State of Montana covering his Montana
charges. (PSI, p.11, 83.)
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May 18, 2015, Mr. Morgan was arrested on the Idaho arrest warrant issued on February 23,
2010. (R., p.57.) Mr. Morgan waived his right to a preliminary hearing, was bound over into the
district court, and on July 24, 2015, an information was filed charging him with felony eluding,
and misdemeanor driving without privileges. (R., pp.34-40.)
Mr. Morgan filed a Motion to Dismiss along with a supporting memorandum and
exhibits. (R., pp.47-83.) The crux of Mr. Morgan’s argument was that the State failed to obtain
an indictment or information within six months of his arrest, and he was entitled to have his case
dismissed, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-3501(1). (R., pp.50-53.) Mr. Morgan argued that the
six-month period started to run either after he was arrested on the original Idaho arrest warrant
(January 21, 2010), or when he agreed to waive extradition (May 20, 2010). (R., p.52.) In either
case, the State failed to meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-3501(1), by failing to obtain an
indictment or information until July of 2015. (R., pp.50-52.) Mr. Morgan further argued that the
State would be unable to show good cause for the delay.2 (R., pp.52-53.)
The State filed a written response to Mr. Morgan’s motion to dismiss arguing that the
statutory right to a speedy trial “does not apply until a warrant for arrest is actually served by the
proper authorities.” (R., pp.84-89.) The State reasoned that Mr. Morgan was not served with his
arrest warrant until May of 2015 when he was arrested in Idaho, and that Montana law
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Mr. Morgan also argued that the State should be prevented from arguing the tolling provisions
of Idaho Code § 19-404 by the doctrine of laches, and that the misdemeanor charge must be
dismissed because Idaho Criminal Rule 48(c) prevents the State from re-filing misdemeanor
charges once they have been dismissed. (R., pp.53-55.) The district court did not address the
tolling provisions of I.C. § 19-404 in its rulings, and granted Mr. Morgan’s motion to dismiss the
misdemeanor charge. (R., pp.131-137, 175-178.) Mr. Morgan, therefore, does not address these
arguments further in this brief.
4

enforcement officers did not have the authority to arrest Mr. Morgan on the Idaho arrest
warrant.3 (R., pp.86-87.)
During the first hearing on Mr. Morgan’s motion to dismiss, the district court raised the
possibility that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers may apply, and the district court gave the
parties additional time to research the issue, although the State maintained its position that the
six-month period articulated in Idaho Code § 19-3501(1) did not begin to run until an Idaho
officer effected the Idaho arrest warrant on Mr. Morgan in May of 2015. (Tr., p.4, L.3 – p.22,
L.25.) Mr. Morgan replied in writing to the State’s argument by providing documentation from
Montana demonstrating that Mr. Morgan had been held in custody in Montana and taken in front
of Montana judges, based upon the Idaho arrest warrants issued by the Idaho Magistrate after
both the originally filed and dismissed case, and the case upon which Mr. Morgan was currently
being held to answer. (R., pp.95-128.) Mr. Morgan’s response included a citation to Montana
Code § 46-30-301, which is nearly identical to Idaho Code § 19-4514, and which authorizes a
Montana officer to conduct a warrantless arrest of an individual, if the officer has reasonable
information that the individual is wanted for a felony in another state. (R., p.96.)
The district court held a second hearing during which both Mr. Morgan’s counsel and the
prosecutor focused their argument on when Mr. Morgan was arrested, as that term is used in I.C.
§ 19-3501(1), with Mr. Morgan’s counsel arguing that he was arrested when he was brought
forth before the Montana Justice of the Peace and ordered to remain in the Lake County Jail on
$10,000.00 bond in February of 2010, and the State continuing to argue that Mr. Morgan was not
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The State also argued that Mr. Morgan is not entitled to credit for the time he served in
Montana, an issue that was not raised by Mr. Morgan. (R., pp.87-88.)
5

arrested until an Idaho officer served the arrest warrant upon him in May of 2018.4 (Tr., p.24,
L.4 – p.27, L.16; p.29, L.7 – p.31, L.20.)

The court took the matter under advisement.

(Tr., p.32, Ls.19-20.)
The district court entered a written decision denying in part 5, Mr. Morgan’s motion to
dismiss.

(R., pp.131-137.)

The district court reasoned that the Interstate Agreement on

Detainers Act, codified at I.C. §§ 19-5001 – 5008, applies and that the six-month period
indicated by I.C. § 19-35016 did not apply. (R., pp.133-135.) The Court reasoned that both the
arrest warrant and the Governor’s warrant acted as a detainer and that Mr. Morgan’s failure to
formally request a trial within 180 days meant he effectively waived his right to a speedy trial.
(R., pp.133-135.)
Mr. Morgan filed a motion for the court to either reconsider its ruling or for a second
motion to dismiss, along with an accompanying memorandum and additional exhibits.7
(R., pp.138-157.) He argued that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers did not apply because
the State of Idaho never placed a detainer on Mr. Morgan. (R., pp.141-145.) Mr. Morgan
reiterated his previous argument he was arrested when he was brought forth in front of a
Montana judge who ordered him held in custody on $10,000.00 bond, based upon the Idaho

4

The parties also discussed whether or not Mr. Morgan actually waived extradition to Idaho,
with the prosecutor informing the court that he received information from Montana officials that
while Mr. Morgan said he would waive extradition, he did not sign a written waiver, and counsel
for Mr. Morgan stating that he was unable to obtain a copy of a written extradition waiver.
(Tr., p.26, L.12 – p.29, L.23.) Whether or not Mr. Morgan waived extradition does not appear to
be relevant to whether or not the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, based
specifically upon I.C. § 19-3501(1)
5
See Footnote 2.
6
The court did not specifically analyze I.C. § 19-3501(1). (R., pp.133-135.)
7
Mr. Morgan’s motion was made in the alternative because counsel had previously misstated
factual information about when Mr. Morgan was released from Montana’s custody, and the
district court appears to have relied upon that misinformation. (R., p.138.) The State did not
6

arrest warrant. (R., pp.144-148.) The State agreed that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Act did not apply as they did not place a detainer on Mr. Morgan, but again argued that
Mr. Morgan was not arrested until May 18, 2015, when Idaho officers effected the arrest
warrant. (R., pp.158-164.)
After conducting a hearing on Mr. Morgan’s second motion, the district court issued a
new written order denying Mr. Morgan’s motion. (R, pp.175-178; Tr., p.35, L.5 – p.72, L.13.)
The court reiterated its previous finding that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act applied,
that a detainer was placed on Mr. Morgan, and that he thereafter failed to request a trial within
180 days as required by that act. (R., pp.176-177.) Additionally, the district court held that,
even if the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act does not apply, Mr. Morgan failed to show
that that his right to a speedy trial enumerated by I.C. § 19-3501 was violated because he failed
to show he was denied due process, as he did not show he was prejudiced by the delay, or that
the delay was a tactical decision by the prosecutor. (R., p.177.)
Mr. Morgan pled guilty to the felony eluding charge conditioned upon his ability to
challenge the district court’s denial of his motions to dismiss on appeal, and he was sentenced to
a suspended unified term of five years, with three years fixed, and placed on probation.
(R., pp.184-193, 206-209; Tr., p.74, L.4 – p.100, L.25.) Mr. Morgan filed a timely Notice of
Appeal. (R., pp.214-215.)

object to the factual corrections but maintained those corrections did not have any legal
consequence. (Tr., p.35, L.19 – p.36, L.11.)
7

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Morgan’s motion to dismiss due to the State’s
failure to obtain an indictment or information within six months of his arrest?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Morgan’s Motion To Dismiss Due To The State’s
Failure To Obtain An Indictment Or Information Within Six Months Of His Arrest
A.

Introduction
Idaho Code § 19-3501(1) states that, absent a showing of good cause by the State, the

district court must order a dismissal of charges “when a person has been held to answer for a
public offense, if an indictment or information is not found against him and filed with the court
within six (6) months from the date of his arrest.” Mr. Morgan asserts that he was arrested, for
purposes of this statute, on February 26, 2010, when he was brought by Montana law
enforcement officers in front of a Montana judge, who ordered him to remain in a Montana jail
unless bond was posted, until such time as Idaho officers went to Montana to take him back to
Idaho. The district court erred in denying Mr. Morgan’s motions to dismiss
B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Morgan’s Motion To Dismiss
Whether a defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial has been violated presents Idaho

Appellate Courts with a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257
(2000) (citation omitted). The Appellate Court defers to the lower court’s findings of fact if they
are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely reviews the legal questions
involved. Id.
1.

The Interstate Agreement On Detainers Act Does Not Apply

Despite both Mr. Morgan and the State arguing otherwise, the district court held that the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, codified in Idaho Code §§ 19-5001 – 5008, applied to
Mr. Morgan’s case. (R., pp.131-137, 175-178.) The court reasoned that the arrest warrant
and/or Governor’s warrant acted as a detainer; thus, pursuant to I.C. § 19-5001(c)(1), it was
incumbent upon Mr. Morgan to initiate proceedings to essentially demand a trial in Idaho within
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180 days. (R., pp.133-135.) Because Mr. Morgan did not initiate these proceedings, his right to
a speedy trial was not violated. (R., pp.133-135.) The district court’s ruling was legally
erroneous.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has interpreted the plain language of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers to apply only to prisoners who are “actually incarcerated in a penal
institution” serving a sentence imposed by the courts of the sending state, and it does not apply
where the defendant is merely being detained prior to disposition of charges in the state where he
is being currently held.

State v. Magnum, 153 Idaho 705, 709 (Ct. App. 2012 (citing

State v. Breen, 126 Idaho 305, 307 (Ct. App. 1994).) The Court of Appeals has also noted that
I.C. § 19-5001(c)(1)’s requirement that a prisoner “must have ‘entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution’ … appears to have been uniformly
interpreted to mean that the I.A.D. is inapplicable to a person who is merely a pretrial detainee
and is not yet serving a sentence.” Breen, 126 Idaho at 307 (citations omitted).
It is undisputed that Mr. Morgan did not begin serving his Montana prison sentence until
after May 20, 2010 (R., p.98); thus, even assuming the arrest warrant or Governor’s warrant
could theoretically serve as a detainer, these warrants did not serve that purpose in this case as
they were filed while Mr. Morgan was merely being detained pending resolution of his Montana
charges. (R., pp.98-130.) Thus, Mr. Morgan’s failure to abide by the requirements of I.C. § 185001(c)(1), does not preclude him from asserting that he was denied his statutory right to a
speedy trial enumerated by I.C. § 19-3501(1).
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2.

Idaho Code § 19-3501(1) Does No Require Mr. Morgan To Show Either That He
Was Prejudiced By The Delay Or That The Delay Was A Tactical Decision By
The State

In denying Mr. Morgan’s second motion to dismiss, the district court held that “even if
the Interstate Detainers Act did not apply, under Idaho Code § 19-3501 the pre-indictment delay
would not amount to denial of the due process of law requiring a speedy trial.” (R., p.177.) It
appears the district court may have conflated the standard applicable to a claim that a defendant’s
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, with the good cause standard applicable to
claims of a violation of the statutory right to a speedy trial articulated in I.C. § 19-3501.
(R., p.177.) The district court’s finding is therefore irrelevant.
As recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court adopted a
four-part test to be used when determining whether there is a violation of the Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) whether the
defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant. Clark, 135
Idaho at 258 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).) Recognizing I.C. § 19-3501
grants defendants additional speedy trial protections beyond those required by the United States
and Idaho Constitutions, the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted the “good cause” standard
articulated in 19-3501 to mean “that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal
excuse of the delay”. Id. at 257-60 (citations omitted). “[T]he ultimate question of whether legal
excuse has been shown is a matter for judicial determination upon the facts and circumstances of
each case,” and Idaho appellate courts “will independently review the lower court’s decision.
Id. at 260.
Notably, neither the plain language of I.C. § 19-3501 nor the Clark Court’s interpretation
of the “good cause” standard, require any showing of prejudice on the part of the defendant or
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that the delay was a tactical decision made by the prosecution. See Clark, 135 Idaho at 257-260;
I.C. §19-3501. Thus, the district court’s finding that Mr. Morgan’s statutory right to a speedy
trial was not violated because he failed to show an additional due process violation is in error.
3.

Mr. Morgan Was “Arrested,” As That Term Is Used In I.C. § 19-3501(1), When
He Was Taken By Montana Officers To Appear In Front Of A Montana Judge,
And Ordered Held In Custody, Due To The Existence Of The Idaho Arrest
Warrant

Mr. Morgan and the prosecutor both agreed that the date of his “arrest,” as that term is
used in I.C. § 19-3501, is determinative of whether his statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant
to I.C. § 19-3501(1) was violated. Idaho Code § 19-601 defines “arrest” as “taking a person into
custody in a case and in the manner authorized by law.” The definition of “arrest” does not
require the service of an arrest warrant. Thus, Mr. Morgan asserts that he was arrested when he
was held in custody by Montana officers based upon the second arrest warrant issued by an
Idaho magistrate.8

Because of the Idaho arrest warrant, a Montana prosecutor initiated

extradition proceedings and asked that Mr. Morgan be held in the Lake County Jail on
$10,000.00 bond, and a Montana Justice of the Peace arraigned Mr. Morgan on the extradition
proceedings and ordered that he be held in the Lake County Jail upon the Montana prosecutor’s
request. (R., pp.101-109.)
The Idaho prosecutor’s argument that Mr. Morgan’s “arrest” did not occur until the
service of the arrest warrant by Idaho officers finds no support in either the plain language of
I.C. §§ 19-3501(1) and 19-601, or in tradition. It is axiomatic that warrantless arrests, based
upon probable cause, is a “manner authorized by law.” See e.g. I.C. § 19-603(3) (authorizing a
peace officer to make an arrest “[o]n a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission
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of a felony by the party arrested.”) Furthermore, as noted by Mr. Morgan’s defense counsel,
Montana law authorizes Montana peace officers to make a warrantless arrest of a person found in
Montana suspected of committing a crime in another state, based “upon reasonable information
that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment for a term of 1 year or more.” (R., p.96 (quoting M.C.A. 46-30-301).) As is
required by the same Montana statute, Mr. Morgan was taken before a Montana judge, a
complaint was “made against the accused under oath setting forth the ground for the arrest,” and
Mr. Morgan was thereafter “heard as if the accused had been arrested on a warrant.”
(R., pp.101-109; see also R., p.96 (quoting M.C.A. 46-30-301).) In short, Mr. Morgan was
arrested on February 26, 2010, based upon the complaint charging him with felony eluding – a
charge that he was held to answer for more than 6 months after his arrest.
It should be noted that the State of Idaho was at no time precluded from seeking an
information or an indictment within 6 months of Mr. Morgan’s arrest in Montana, despite the
fact that Mr. Morgan never executed a written extradition waiver. First of all, Mr. Morgan’s
presence in Idaho was not necessary for the State to seek an indictment. See I.C. §§ 19-1401 –
1433. Second, Idaho officials could have filed a timely detainer with the Montana Department
of Correction after Mr. Morgan was sentenced for his Montana crimes, which occurred less than
three months after his arrest on the Idaho charges. See State v. Breen, 126 Idaho 305, 307
(Ct. App. 1994); I.C. §§ 19-5001 – 5008. Any delay in the proceedings at that point due to
Mr. Morgan serving his Montana sentence certainly would constitute “good cause.” Thus, this

8

Mr. Morgan acknowledges the six-month time limit stemming from his arrest on the original
warrant, issued in conjunction with the original criminal complaint, was effectively extinguished
when that complaint was dismissed.
13

Court should reject any post hoc argument on the part of the State claiming that Mr. Morgan
somehow facilitated the State’s failure to meet the requirements of I.C. §19-3501(1).
4.

The State Failed To Obtain An Information Or Indictment Within Six Months Of
Mr. Morgan’s Arrest And Did Not Demonstrate Good Cause For The Delay;
Thus, The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Morgan’s Motions To Dismiss

As noted above, Idaho Code § 19-3501(1) states that absent a showing of good cause by
the State, the district court must order a dismissal of charges “when a person has been held to
answer for a public offense, if an indictment or information is not found against him and filed
with the court within six (6) months from the date of his arrest.” Mr. Morgan asserts he was
arrested for felony eluding as charged in this case on February 26, 2010, and the information was
not filed until July 24, 2015. (R., pp.37-39, 101-109.) The State did not argue there was good
cause for their delay, relying instead upon their argument that Mr. Morgan was not arrested until
the service of the arrest warrant in May of 2015 – an argument unsupported by the law.
Mr. Morgan thus asserts that the district court erred in denying his motions to dismiss this case.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Morgan respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s orders
denying his motions to dismiss, and to vacate his conviction for felony eluding, and the sentence
imposed upon that conviction.
DATED this 6th day of January, 2017.

_______/S/__________________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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